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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By
I.

ALLAN SHAW

ALIMONY AND

SUPPORT PAYMENTS

In McMichael v. McMichael,1 the wife obtained a divorce and
permanent alimony of 10,000 dollars in monthly installments of 125
dollars, as well as attorney's fees. The husband paid the attorney's
fees without objection but appealed to the supreme court by writ
of error seeking reversal of the order for the payment of permanent
alimony. He contended that the trial court had abused its discretion
in ordering the payment of alimony, and that the payment was not
really alimony but rather a property settlement. His argument was
based on the fact that no provision was made for its termination
on the death or remarriage of the wife, or his own death. The
supreme court rejected the husband's contention that the award
was a property settlement rather than alimony, stating that the
conditions which might require a modification or termination of
payments could be dealt with when they occurred. The court then
held the award of alimony was proper and stated: "We have repeatedly held that the amount of alimony to be awarded is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court and'2 will not be
disturbed if there is credible evidence to support it."
The financial history of the marriage showed that at the time
of the marriage the wife had assets of between 80,000 and 150,000
dollars and that the husband had no assets. However, at the time
of the divorce neither the wife nor the husband had any appreciable
assets. On these facts the court found ample credible evidence to
support the lower court's judgment.
Liggett v. Liggett3 is another case in which the discretion of
the trial court was questioned. In this case the wife, from whom
the husband had been granted a divorce because of her excessive
use of alcohol and drugs, brought a writ of error contending that
she was entitled to a property settlement which had been denied
her, and that the 7,500 dollars alimony awarded her was not reasonable. The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion; according to the evidence, the wife had failed to perform
her duties as a wife and partner in the marriage relationship and
had not contributed to the business or financial resources of the
parties. There was no evidence that the award of alimony was
unreasonable, and the supreme court declined to interfere with the
trial court's decision in this case.
The trial court's discretion in awarding separate maintenance
rather than alimony in Hayutin v. Hayutin4 was upheld by the
supreme court on the same reasoning as applied in alimony cases.
Quoting from a Colorado decision, 5 the court said:
It is fundamental that the question of the amount of
alimony awarded rests in the sound discretion of the trial
Junior Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 380 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 234.
3 380 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1963).
4 381 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1963).
5 McPheeters v. McPheeters, 132 Colo. 312, 287 P.2d 959 (1955).
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judge if supported by competent evidence. Kleiger v.
Kleiger, 127 Colo. 86, 254 P.2d 426. The award when made
will not be disturbed or modified by this court in the
absence of a showing of abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge. A careful consideration of the record here
presented fails to show an abuse of discretion.6
The Hayutin case had an interesting twist in that the husband,
after less than three months of marriage, instituted annulment
proceedings in Nevada where the marriage had taken place. The
wife subsequently brought an action in Colorado for separate
maintenance. Since a final determination had not been reached by
the Nevada court, the trial court ordered the husband to refrain
from proceeding with the Nevada action. The supreme court, in
sustaining the order of the trial court, stated that the general rule
is ". . . well established that courts of equity will and should in
proper cases enjoin a party to a divorce or separate maintenance
action from
proceeding in an annulment suit in a foreign juris7
diction."
Alexander v. District Court" was a divorce action in which the
husband was granted the decree and the wife awarded alimony.
Subsequently, the trial court without notice to the wife or her
attorney vacated the award of alimony; and the wife, in an original
mandamus proceeding, sought to have the award reinstated. The
respondent judge stated that he had vacated the alimony award
after reconsideration of the case because he felt that the award
was not supported by the evidence. The supreme court reinstated
the award holding that the trial court, which had jurisdiction over
the parties originally, was without jurisdiction or authority to
vacate an award of alimony after its entry without notice to the
parties even though the court concluded that it had committed
error in the original awarding of alimony.
II.

ALTERATION OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS

Three 1963 Colorado cases considered the propriety of altering
support payments after a divorce had been granted and the conditions upon which the support payments were based had changed.
The first case, Griffith v. Griffith,9 was a proceeding on a motion
to vacate a judgment for unpaid monthly child support payments.
The husband had been granted the divorce, there had been a
property settlement, and the husband had been ordered to pay
75 dollars monthly for support of a child whose custody was
awarded to the mother. The mother subsequently secreted herself
and the child, remarried, and had her second husband tell the
first that they did not want his money. Being unable to make
further support payments, the father let them lapse and the mother
brought suit when he became 5,400 dollars in arrearage. Upon a
hearing, the mother agreed to a reduction to 2,500 dollars, but the
trial court awarded her only 1,000 dollars, and she brought a writ
of error claiming that the trial court was without power to cancel
the payments which were due. The supreme court agreed that
6
7
8
9

381
Id.
387
381

P.2d at 275.
at 273.
P.2d 726 (Colo. 1963).
P.2d 455 (Colo. 1963).
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under the general rule an order reducing the amount of support
money operates only in futuro,10 but held that when the mother's
admissions and actions showed that equity required a reduction of
past-due payments, the mother could not object because the reduction given by the trial court was not to her liking. The trial court
had found that a lesser sum than asked for by the mother would
adequately provide for the child.
The case of Garrow v. Garrow" involved a review of an order
of the district court modifying the terms of child support and
visitation rights. The district court had ordered an increase in
child support payments from 100 to 190 dollars per month, such
increase being based on the fact that the divorced husband's income
had increased from 350 dollars per month at the time of the
divorce to 500 dollars per month at the time of the hearing. The
ex-husband brought a writ of error claiming that the trial court
had abused its discretion in increasing the support payments, granting the attorney's fees, and ordering that he take the children
to church at the discretion of their mother. The court, in affirming
the decision of the lower court, quoted from the case of Brown v.
Brown 12 which clearly and explicitly states the applicable Colorado
law governing the present case:
It always has been recognized in this jurisdiction that if
the financial ability of the husband and father improves,
and the needs of the minor children increase, the jurisdiction of the court to make additional orders for the care
and maintenance of the minor children
may be invoked
13
at any time in the proper proceeding.
Looking to the facts of the case, the court found that there was
sufficient evidence to justify the order of the trial court.
In Drazich v. Drazich,14 the father petitioned for a reduction
of support payments because his daughter had finished high school
and had obtained a job. The petition was not acted upon, and the
father reduced the payments on his own initiative. Upon suit by
the mother for past payments owed by the father, the trial court
awarded them to her. The father sought relief by writ of error
on the theory that the trial court had erred in entering judgment
for the arrearage in support money in the face of his showing that
his daughter was emancipated when his petition was filed. He urged
the supreme court to direct the trial court to issue a nuc pro tunc
order to do what he contended should have been done earliernamely, order that he should no longer be required to make support payments for his emancipated daughter who was no longer
living at home. The supreme court, however, upheld the judgment
of the lower court and ordered that the past payments that were
due be paid. Citing a number of Colorado cases, the court stated
that in support matters, each installment maturing under a decree
which has not been modified becomes a judgment debt similar to
any other judgment for money, 15 and the trial court was without
10 Engleman v. Engleman, 145 Colo. 299, 358 P.2d 864 (1961).
11 382 P.2d 809 (Cola. 1963).
12 131 Colo. 467, 283 P.2d 951 (1955).
13 382 P.2d at 811.
14 385 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1963).
15 Taylor v. Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 326 P.2d 1027 (1961); Burke v.
P.2d 740 (1953).

Burke, 127 Colo.

257, 255
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power to enter an order which would, in effect, amount to a cancellation of delinquent support payments. 6 "A modifying order or
decree relates only to future
payments and can be effective only
17
from the time of its entry.'
III.

REMOVAL

OF CHILDREN

FROM THE STATE

Two 1963 Colorado cases dealt with problems that arise when
the parent having custody of the children desires to remove them
from the state. Nelson v. Grissom18 illustrates an important factor to
be taken into consideration in the removal of custodial children
from the state. The mother, who had the custody of the two
children, had remarried and requested that she be allowed to take
the children with her to California where her present husband was
employed. The father contested the request and attempted to
introduce into evidence hospital records relating to the second
husband's emotional instability. The trial court refused to receive
this evidence and the father brought a writ of error, claiming that
is was in the best interests of the children that the facts contained
in the hospital records be known to the trial court. The supreme
court ruled that the hospital records were not privileged insofar
as this question was concerned and should have been admitted
into evidence. The issue before the trial court being whether or
not it was in the best interests of the minor children to permit
their removal, evidence of the emotional stability or instability of
the stepfather was material to the issue though he was not a party
to the litigation.
The second case, Tanttila v. Tanttila, 9 dealt more thoroughly
with the problem of removal and was one of the court's more
interesting decisions. The mother of the three minor children asked
for and was granted permission by the lower court to remove the
children to her home in Minnesota. The father brought a writ of
error to review the decision of the trial court. He contended that
removal was not in the best interests of the children, that it would
unreasonably deprive him of his visitation rights, and that it was
purely for the convenience of the mother.
16
17
IS
19

Ferkovich
385 P.2d
382 P.2d
382 P.2d

v. Ferkovich, 130 Colo. 228, 274 P.2d 602 (1954).
at 260.
991 (Colo. 1963).
798 (Colo. 1963).
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The judgment was reversed and the order authorizing the
removal vacated. Citing a Colorado decision,! ° the supreme court
reiterated its holding therein that it is contrary to Colorado law to
permit the removal of children from the jurisdiction unless their
best interests would be served; but if it is determined that removal
would be in the children's best interests, it should be allowed. The
court, quoting from a Colorado case,-' listed the factors that are to
be considered in determining what is in the best interests of the
children:
In determining what is for the best welfare of a child
of tender years, the courts must consider not only food,
clothing, shelter, care, education, and environment, but
also bear in mind that every such child is entitled to the
love, nurture, advice, and training of both father and
mother, and to deny to the child an opportunity to know,
associate with, love, and be loved by either parent, may be
a more serious ill than to refuse it in some part those things
which money can buy.22
Examining the facts in the light of the above language, the
majority of the court felt that it was in the best interests of the
children to remain in Colorado. The evidence failed to show that
the children would be in a better environment if the removal
were allowed. If more support were required for the children so
that they could stay in Colorado, the father was willing and able
to provide it. The court agreed with the father's contention that the
removal was solely for the mother's personal convenience.
IV. ADOPTION
The supreme court considered only one adoption case in 1963.
In Pelt v. Tunks,23 the defendants adopted an infant born to the
plaintiff, an nnwed mother. More than seven months after the
final decree of adoption had been entered, the plaintiff filed a
petition for revocation of the decree. No hearings were held, and a
minute order was entered which set aside the adoption decree
and gave the defendants 10 days within which to answer. On that
same day the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
setting aside the adoption, dispensing with a motion for a new
trial, and giving the defendants 10 days within which to file their
appeal. In other words, on the day the defendants were given
10 days to answer the petition, an order was entered making the
action of the court final. The defendants requested that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded to the county court
with directions to set the matter for hearing on the merits; this
request was granted by the court.
V.

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE

An interesting situation was presented to the court in Ward v.
Terriere.24 The plaintiff, claiming rights as a widow, brought suit
20McGonigle v. McGonigle, 112 Colo. 569, 151 P.2d 977 (1944).
21 Searle v. Searle, 115 Colo. 266, 172 P.2d 837 (1946).
22 382 P.2d at 799.
23 385 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1963).
24 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL. XLI

against the estate of her deceased former husband. She alleged
that although she had been granted a divorce, three and one-half
years later she had moved that the divorce decree be set aside. In
the alternative, she contended that even if the divorce decree was
valid, she and the deceased had become husband and wife by entering into a common law marriage subsequent to the divorce. The
trial court ruled against her on both contentions.
On the first of the plaintiff's contentions, the supreme court
ruled that the trial court was bound by the final decree of divorce
and was correct in its holding that the divorce could not be dismissed. The interlocutory decree granting the divorce, by force of
law, 25 became final six months from its date of entry. The plaintiff's
motion to set aside the decree was not made within the six months
limitation and thus, from the record, the supreme court found that
the county court had no jurisdiction to dismiss such a case which
had proceeded to final judgment.
On the second contention as to the common law remarriage,
the supreme court found the issue to have been correctly resolved
by the trial court that had weighed the testimony which, although
conflicting, was heavily against the plaintiff. The trial court had
found that although there was evidence of cohabitation and posing
as husband and wife between the parties, by and large, the plaintiff
had not conducted herself as though she had been bound in marriage, but had only tried to convey the impression of a marriage
relationship between herself and the deceased when it was to her
convenience or best interest.
VI.

PATERNITY AND

DEPENDENCY

In 1963 the Supreme Court of Colorado heard one paternity
and two dependency cases. In the paternity case, Beck v. Beck,26
the juvenile court considered the question of whether the husband
had access to his wife during the possible period of conception of
her child which, she alleged, was his. At the conclusion of the
trial a verdict in her favor was directed. The husband then filed
a motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto attaching thereto
a blood test taken after the trial by agreement of the parties before
trial. The blood test showed that it was impossible for the husband
to have been the father of the child. The trial court granted the
husband's motion and a writ of error was brought by the wife who
contended that blood tests were incompetent to overcome the pre27
sumption of legitimacy. The court cited the Colorado statute
which permits the court to order that blood tests be taken in
paternity proceedings and held that the statute entitles the reputed
father to have the tests made and the results introduced into
evidence when definite exclusion is established, provided a proper
foundation has been laid. When such evidence is introduced, it is
competent to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. The court
felt that to hold otherwise would be acting contrary to an established scientific fact.
25 Colo. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 91, § 3.
26 384 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1963).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 52-1-27 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
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In Martinez v. Lopez, 28 the mother brought an action in the
juvenile court under C.R.S. '53 § 22-7-1 charging the defendant with
contributing to the child's dependency. The defendant, Martinez,
denied paternity and also denied that the child was dependent
as contemplated by the statute under which the proceedings were
instituted. In a jury trial he was found to be the father of the child
and contributing to her dependency. However, no judgment was
entered on the verdict that he was contributing to the dependency
of the child. Following the denial of a motion for a new trial, the
defendant brought a writ of error. The supreme court reversed
the judgment and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss
the proceedings, stating that the statute under which the action was
brought provided expressly that the juvenile court could handle
dependency proceedings, but not paternity suits. Citing the case of
Everett v. Barry,29 the court stressed that the juvenile court is a
statutory court with no jurisdiction beyond that expressly given
by statute. Thus, the court reasoned, a paternity matter could not
be properly determined under a statute providing for dependency
proceedings. As far as the dependency matter was concerned, in
light of the complete lack of evidence showing either that the
child was dependent or the defendant was contributing toward her
dependency, the juvenile court should have directed a verdict for
the defendant. The court said, "To permit one to expand the
statutory proceedings on 'contributing to dependency' beyond the
construction guidelines in 22-7-7 would effect judicial repeal of the
and would forever remove the
provisions on 'paternity proceedings'
30
limitations therein contained.
As far as the actual question of paternity was concerned, the
paternity statute, C.R.S. '53 § 22-6-1, provides that an action must
be brought before the child is 12 months old and can be brought
by the mother only. The first of these conditions was not complied
with as the child was 4 years old at the time of the proceedings.
The plaintiff was, therefore, precluded from bringing a paternity
action under the paternity statute, and the decision of the court
prohibited her from accomplishing a decree of paternity under the
guise of a dependency suit.
In Nissen v. People,31 the mother claimed that the defendant,
the alleged father, was contributing to the dependency of the child.
In the lower court a judgment from which the father brought a
writ of error was entered against him. The supreme court reversed,
holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the daughter was a
dependent or negligent child, and without the showing that the child
was dependent there was nothing the defendant could be contributing to.
The court cited Martinez v. Lopez 32 discussed above and stated
that it was controlling in the disposition of the present case. In
both cases evidence was introduced which established that the
mother was earning sufficient funds to support the child; and,
therefore, the child was not dependent as alleged.
28
29
30
31
32

386 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1963).
127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953).
386 P.2d at 598.
387 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1963).
Supra note 28.

